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ONE-WAY CONTRACTS: 
CONSUMER PROTECTION WITHOUT LAW 
 
Omri Ben-Shahar* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
What if consumer contracts were legally enforceable only 
against the consumers, but not against the business? This 
paper, part of my project on the “myths of consumer 
protection,” describes a regime of “one-way contracts”—
contracts between consumers and business to which only 
consumers are bound, the business is not. A breaching 
business would face no contractual liability. The paper 
argues that many consumer contracts are already disguised 
one-way contracts. It then demonstrates the variety of 
alternative consumer protections devices that would 
emerge in the total absence of legal protection. In a one-way 
contracts world, transactions will be redesigned to limit 
consumers’ exposure to breach; insurance and bond services 
would develop to protect aggrieved consumers; reputation 
services and rating intermediaries would have a greater 
role; and public enforcement could potentially fill some of 
the remaining deterrence gaps. Thus, despite weakening 
the legal protections, the one-way contracts regime has the 
potential to improve consumer well being. The paper 
concludes that the focus within the consumer protection 
movement on enhancing access to, and the scope of, legal 
remedies may be misguided. 
 
                                                        
* Frank and Bernice Greenberg Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am 
grateful to Oren Bar‐Gill, Saul Levmore, and Ariel Porat for helpful suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose standard form contracts between businesses and consumers 
where “one-way contracts”—enforceable only against one party, not the other. 
You probably think: enforceable only against the business, not the 
consumers—an extreme version of the consumer-protection approach that 
has been percolating broadly. But I actually have in mind the opposite one-
way contract—enforceable only against the consumers, not against the 
business. The consumers are bound, unable to escape any of their obligations 
under the substantive terms or the fine print: they have to pay the contract 
price, the hidden fees, abide by any restrictive provisions (as long as they are 
legal), commit to the full term of the service, and so on. The business on the 
other hand, is not legally bound to anything it promised, and aggrieved 
consumers are unable to legally enforce any of their rights that appear in 
what we normally think as the “contract:” not timely delivery, not the return 
policy, not the warranty, not even the conforming delivery itself. No court-
imposed remedy whatsoever. 
How in the world can this make sense (even as a thought experiment)? 
The reality of the market is already such that businesses have greater power 
and sophistication. Surely, consumers, not the business, are on the side that 
needs protection. They are less informed, less well funded, plagued by 
collective action problems, and overall less able to secure compliance with 
their side of the bargain. If anything, contract law should remedy this 
asymmetry, not reflect it. Why, then, go astray and imagine a regime of one-
way contracts in which only consumers are stripped of the power to sue for 
breach of promise, thus are further disarmed vis-à-vis their mighty business 
opponents? 
I argue that the concept of one-way contracts is a useful concept that 
delivers two essential insights. The first insight is a positive-descriptive 
metaphor—a way to capture much of the reality of business-to-consumer 
relations and to investigate its effects. The second insight is normative, 
suggesting that further gravitation towards a one-way contracts module 
could actually benefit consumers. Rather than augmenting the legal remedies 
that consumers have under contract law (the stated goal of the consumer 
protection movement), the social controls of the business-to-consumer deal 
ought to be restricted to techniques that, unlike contract law, actually work. 
The thesis begins with the quite obvious observation that in the 
existing legal landscape, the power of consumers to legally enforce the terms 
of the contract provides a very shabby safety cushion. For the great majority 
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of consumers, the presence of a “contract” accompanying the goods or 
services, and of contract law at the background, is irrelevant. Recognizing 
this weakness of the law, solutions can go in one of two ways. One way is to 
strengthen contract rights and contract law’s involvement. In this spirit, 
consumer protection oriented reforms that are often advocated include better 
disclosures, more effective rituals of assent, stronger remedies for breach of 
contract, and mandatory substantive terms to assure minimum standards. 
Elsewhere, I expressed doubts concerning the effectiveness of some of these 
efforts.1   
A second way to address the weakness of contract law in the consumer 
area is to abandon contract law as the locus of consumer protection, and to 
seek protection from alternative sources, which do not rely on private 
enforcement of the contract by aggrieved consumers. A significant component 
of my thesis in this paper is to describe the value and the trajectory of 
alternative, non-legal protections of consumer rights. What are these non-
legal protections? 
First, if consumer transactions are impossible to legally enforce, they 
might be designed differently, to address consumers’ anxiety about their non-
rights. Recognizing that they have no legal recourse, consumers might be 
reluctant to pay upfront and await, or pray for, timely conforming delivery. 
Instead, consumers might require (and businesses might accord them) 
delivery and the opportunity to inspect prior to making commitments or 
payments. Instead of paying and then relying on promises and assurances—
the legal guaranty—consumers will prefer the transaction to be carved up 
into pieces with corresponding “progress commitments.” One can imagine 
that instead of buying a computer for $2000 and putting such big payment at 
risk, consumers will lease computers for $250 per year, with the option to 
terminate each year. Innovations in transactions costs technology can make 
the divisibility of commitment efficient. 
Second, private bonds and assurances can develop to secure the 
consumers against non-performance. In the same way that eBay Motors 
provides disappointed buyers a fund from which they can recover the lost 
payment when the seller takes the money and runs, market makers and 
intermediaries might offer bonds and set up recovery funds to induce buyers 
to enter the market. If eBay offers a $2000 per-transaction bond (financed by 
a fee on sellers), a buyer might still buy, rather than lease, the $2000 
                                                        
1 Omri Ben‐Shahar, The Myth of Opportunity to Read in Contract Law, 5 Eur. Rev. Contract Law 
(2009); Omri Ben‐Shahar and Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (Mimeo., University 
of Chicago Law School 2009) 
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computer, but do it on eBay. Of course, intermediaries might in turn ask for 
assurances and bonds from sellers to secure their own risk. But the 
emergence of such intermediaries would accord them market power against 
sellers, which would be harnessed to warrant consumers’ satisfaction. In this 
example, eBay would be in effect consumers’ enforcement agent. 
Third, consumers may have a greater need to insure against bad 
performance by the business (assuming, again, that insurance transactions—
another species of consumer-to-business contract—are effectively 
enforceable). A buyer of a $2000 computer might be offered, say, a $100 
insurance policy with coverage for some common problems.  In this 
environment, insurers will have a role that goes beyond passive coverage. 
They will be able to profit more if they monitor the businesses whose 
opportunism is the insured peril. I will argue that even if insurers are not 
subrogated to the right to sue the breaching business, they can use other 
methods to deter bad behavior, e.g., by threatening to blacklist the business if 
its record slips, refusing to insure its transactions in the future, and thus 
alerting consumers and rendering the non-performance risk more salient. 
Like in many insurance markets, insurers can aggregate and share actuarial 
data on the non-performance risk that businesses pose, thereby improving 
the dissemination of information and accurate pricing. The insurance 
premium can be $100 for the bad type computer vendor, $50 for the good. 
Fourth, importantly, without effective legal protections consumers 
have to rely even more on the performance reputation of businesses. Thus, 
the ability of a business to attract new customers and to charge higher prices 
would depend on the reliability of feedback scores, ratings, consumer surveys, 
reports by watchdog groups—that is, on the aggregate measures of the 
scattered experiences of past customers. These methods exist even in areas in 
which contracts are enforceable two-way, but they are particularly valuable 
and more widely available in areas in which consumers fear that the legal 
rights are worthless. For example, many people buy $2000 computers on 
eBay (where it would be close to impossible to get a court remedy for breach), 
but only because they can check that the seller’s feedback score for 
transactions of this type is satisfactory. Further elimination of legal 
protections would necessarily breed more of these reputation devices. 
Fifth, businesses might have a stronger incentive to go beyond their 
(legally binding) rights, to “forgive” consumers who request special 
accommodations, to refrain from enforcing to the letter fine print and the 
hidden fees—in short, to act cooperatively in the shadow of their enforceable 
legal rights. Such conduct would be intended to infuse consumer confidence 
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especially among the otherwise reluctant consumers who, themselves without 
enforceable contractual rights, are rationally anxious. Thus, ironically, the 
absence of enforceable contractual rights could boost the bottom line average 
value that consumers get, all else equal.  
Recognizing these (and several other) consumer protections 
mechanisms, the paper turns to offer it main normative claim. I argue that 
consumers can potentially benefit if their legal rights, which are almost 
impossible to enforce in court anyway, would be stripped altogether. 
Consumer contracts could be transformed into one-way contracts, in which 
only the business acquires legally enforceable rights, without harming 
consumers. In fact—and this is the more ambitious normative claim—taking 
away these legal rights by transforming consumer contracts into one-way 
contracts could improve matters for consumers. The absence of legal rights 
could alert consumers and bolster the emergence of the more effective non-
legal consumer protections that might otherwise be slow to develop. It would 
also solve a collective action problem that may stand in the way of more 
robust non-legal protections. 
Before exploring the alternative safeguards that could develop in a 
one-way contracts world, I argue that this regime is not as bizarre as it might 
initially seem. In fact, some existing markets can be characterized as de fact 
one-way contract sectors. I am not referring merely to the phenomenon that 
the most contractual rights that consumers get are ineffective and have no 
threat value in a lawsuit. Rather, I am referring to consumer transactions 
that are largely done without a “contract,” at least not one that protects the 
consumer. Think about supermarket purchases. There is, of course, a legal 
contract between the consumer and Giant Foods. A staple of first-year 
contracts courses is deciphering the offer, acceptance, and contract formation 
moment in such generic transactions. But this is merely a “pedagogical” 
contract. Unlike many other consumer transactions, in the supermarket 
there is no boilerplate involved, no click ‘I Agree,’ no shrinkwrap, no 
additional term-of-service record attached to deal—no explicit moment of 
assent. Pay-the-labeled-price-and-it’s-yours, this is the contract. How often do 
consumers sue supermarkets? What can they sue the supermarket for? What 
are the warranties? Are gap-fillers ever invoked? Have you ever heard of 
expectation damages assessed against, or disclaimed by, supermarkets? 
Rarely do these issues come up, because supermarkets will normally 
accommodate aggrieved shoppers by replacing items or refunding money, and 
if they don’t they will probably lose business. These are not pure one-way 
contracts, but many consumers will not know the difference. I will argue that 
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the same is true with respect to other common consumer transactions, such 
as taxicab services and restaurants. Consumers do not (and probably cannot) 
recover for breach of promise.  
While the paper takes a highly skeptical view of the role of contract 
law in consumer protection, it is by no means an “anti-consumer” manifesto. 
On the contrary: the argument in favor of one-way contracts is not based on 
the interests of businesses. If my argument is correct, businesses don’t care 
much whether contracts are one- or two-way, since they do not pose a 
significant threat of liability either way. The one-way contract thesis is 
friendly to consumer interests because it suggests that meaningful protection 
can and should be achieved by the design of more potent substitutes. Within 
contract law, the plight of consumers is often regarded as a basis for 
enhancing contract enforcement and of bolstering the access of consumers to 
breach of contract remedies. The one-way contract idea suggests that this is a 
misguided priority, barking up the wrong tree. Consumer protection ought to 
be accomplished by abandoning contract claims. 
Part I of this Essay begins with a brief account of the asymmetric 
enforcement problem posed by consumers-to-business contracts, and why this 
problem is not solved by standard mechanisms like class actions. Part II of 
this Essay introduces the conceptual structure of one-way contracts. Which 
contracts would this regime apply to? Which terms and which violations will 
be unenforceable? Part III explores some real life examples for the one-way 
contracts regime. Part IV is the core of the Essay: it discusses the alternative 
protections that would emerge in the absence of legal enforcement, to 
safeguard the interests of consumers. Part V explains why the one-way 
contract structure is necessary to fire up these alternative protections. 
Finally Part VI concludes, commenting on the value of the one-way contracts 
template as a conceptual framework. 
 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH CONSUMERS-TO-BUSINESS CONTRACTS 
 
The phenomenon of standard form contracting between consumers and 
business (B2C) is as troubling for contract law as it is viable for the economy. 
Much ink has been spilled to explain whey standard form contracting is 
desirable, analogizing it to standard form production of goods. Plenty of 
attention has also been drawn to the dangers involved in standard-form, fine-
print contracting—what many scholars and judges identify as “contract of 
adhesion.” Bad things can be buried in the boilerplate, and when the time 
comes for the business to fulfill its part of the obligation consumers might be 
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surprised to learn that what they thought they bargained for was 
meticulously drafted away in fine print. 
Sometimes the problem with B2C contracts is the bad terms. These are 
the pro-business terms of the contract: the disclaimers, the limitation of 
rights, the restrictions on use, the strict procedures, the narrow definitions, 
and the like. The problem here is that the terms are enforceable even when 
they are quite nasty, and even if consumers expected something better. Other 
times, the problem with B2C contracts is the opposite: there are good terms 
in the contract—the pro-consumer terms—securing consumer rights (e.g., the 
right to get the product as described, the express warranty, property rights, 
rescission rights), but it turns out that they are not easily enforceable. Few if 
any consumers can overcome the runarounds that a reluctant business, if it 
decides not to fulfill its obligations, puts them through. Enforcement is costly 
and largely impractical. In the absence of a credible threat to sue, businesses 
are undeterred and consumers’ contractual rights are in jeopardy.  
A prominent occupation of modern contract law is designing solutions 
to the problems of standard form contracting and advocating protections for 
frustrated consumers. As to the problem of the business’ excessive benefit in 
the bargain, solutions range from providing consumers opportunities to read 
the contract, to weeding out the truly unconscionable pro-business terms 
through surgical judicial ex post intervention. But what about the problem of 
the under enforced consumer end of the bargain—can the law boost the 
implementation of the consumer side of the deal? 
There are some obvious problems with enforcement. Most contractual 
claims are small. Damages, even if measured by the expectation measure, are 
too insignificant to justify a costly suit (whereas large consequential damages 
are routinely limited in a conspicuous way in the contract). Theoretically, it is 
possible to aggregate claims into class actions, but the impediments in the 
contractual setting are significant. For one, it only applies to systematic 
violations. When the individual claims are small, members of the class are 
hard to identify and only a small compensatory effect is achieved. And given 
that a substantial component of the outcome consists of attorneys’ fees, there 
is a non-trivial problem of separating the meritorious suits from the frivolous 
ones. The fact is that despite a broad push for class litigation in state 
consumer protection laws, there is a prevailing sense that consumers’ plight 
has not been answered. 
Bolstering consumer protection through contract law runs into the 
additional problem that businesses can draft around various limitations set 
by law. For example, if the law tries to offer additional protection to 
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consumers by increasing remedies, businesses can conspicuously limit the 
remedies. If the law installs procedures securing access to justice, businesses 
can draft their way out of court through choice of law and mandatory 
arbitration clauses. If the law finds such arbitration clauses unconscionable 
and vacates them, business again resort to redrafting to introduce 
incremental changes to these clauses so as to make them legally tolerable. 
The target for consumer protection is elusive, the business parties are 
sophisticated and well-counseled, and as long as the law is unwilling to fully 
regulate the contract through mandatory terms, there is no clear solution. 
Indeed, recognizing that the problems with private enforcement of 
consumers rights is so basic, legislators have sought to redress them by 
providing a host of statutory non-disclaimable remedies and procedures, 
through the enactment of consumer protections laws. Initially, these were 
public law procedures, initiated by agencies and without direct compensation 
to consumers. Largely through administrative rulemaking, the FTC 
developed definitions for unfair and deceptive practices and exercised its 
powers to enjoin and sanction offending businesses.2 Subsequently, all states 
followed and enacted Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs), taking a significant 
step further.3  These “little FTC acts” as they are known—often expand the 
remunerated list of practices that are presumptively unfair or deceptive, but 
more importantly they allow aggrieved consumers to bring “private attorney 
general” actions against alleged offenders and make it much easier than 
traditional contract law to recover damages, including punitive damage and 
attorney fees. They also render the class action strategy easier to apply. 
These remedies are effective. In fact, some commentators worry that 
they are overly effective, leading to excessive and frivolous suits.4 In 
California, for example, these worries led to a successful referendum to limit 
“shakedown” suits against businesses.5 Indeed, one of my arguments below is 
that strengthening consumers’ power to bring contractual suits is 
unnecessary because suits under CPAs accomplish more than contract breach 
suits can ever hope to. But while CPAs provide legal redress in many 
                                                        
2 Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman, Common­Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2005). 
3 See, e.g., the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 17 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§17.41— 17.63.  
4 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 2; Henry N. Butler and Jason S. Johnston, Consumer Harm 
Acts? An Economic Analysis of Private Actions under State Consumer Protection Acts (mimeo. 2008). 
5 See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE AND SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE, 
2004 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION, NOV. 2, 2004, at 45 (2004), 
www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_general/ssov/formatted_ballot_measures_detail.pdf 
(Proposition 64 passed with the support of 59.0% of the votes). 
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contexts, they are not equivalent to contract breach remedies. For one, they 
apply only to a subset of what is normally regarded as breach of contractual 
duties. That is, they apply to systematic conduct, mostly precontractual, that 
is intended to mislead consumers by false promises and deceptive 
descriptions. CPA causes of actions are aimed at blameworthy behavior by 
business, often intentional and systematic deception; they thus add an 
element of fault that is usually not necessary for a showing of breach of 
contract.  
Further, by allowing punitive or statutory damages and authorizing 
private attorneys general to represent the aggrieved parties, CPAs conform 
more closely to the deterrence model of criminal law than to the 
compensation model of private law. Their purpose is to protect the integrity 
of the public sphere—the consumer market—not the individual victim. Also, 
even though the incidence of CPA suits increased dramatically in recent 
years, it is still a far cry from systematically addressing contract breach. The 
vast majority of consumers who suffer breach of contract by the business are 
not aware of their CPA rights, do not file or join CPA suits, and will not 
benefit by the remote chance that there was a filing of a CPA suit by others. 
The broad recognition that traditional notions of contract law fail to 
adequately protect consumers is further demonstrated by the shift towards 
regulation of the terms of the consumer contract. It is increasingly believed 
that even in competitive markets consumers agree to contract terms that are 
undesirable.6 To correct for these market failures, many aspects of consumer 
contracts are regulated and the terms are mandated by the government. For 
example, the European Community has promulgated rules that forbid 
particular terms from appearing in consumer contracts.7 Similarly, the 
Obama administration has put forward a set of proposals to regulate 
consumer financial contracts by mandating not only disclosure, but also the 
substance of important terms.8 Whether these minimum standard 
regulations can help consumers vindicate their contractual rights is 
questionable. A business that breaches a mandated contractual right of the 
consumer still needs to be sued. A contractual right that is effectively 
                                                        
6 For a recent economic analysis of anticompetitive use of contract language, see David Gilo and 
Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transactions Costs, in BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET 
CONTRACTS 66 (O. Ben‐Shahar, Ed. 2006). 
7 See, e.g. DCFR Intr. 27‐28; DCFR II.‐9:411 (“Terms which are presumed to be unfair in contracts 
between a business and a consumer”); Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms 
in consumer contracts. 
8 See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 [cite]; See also 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 15 (Dept of Treasury 2009). 
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unenforceable is not any more secure by virtue of being government 
mandated. 
Indeed, a substantial part of recent reform proposals is to return to 
agency enforcement as an alternative to private action by harmed consumers. 
For example, the proposed new Consumer Financial Protection Agency 
(CFPA) would have its own supervisory and enforcement authority with 
subpoena powers and ability to enforce compliance with its regulations in the 
same way that the Department of Justice enforces civil rights statutes.9 
Whether or not these reforms would help consumers can be debated, but they 
do display a fundamental belief that contract law and private actions do not 
have enough horsepower to carry the burden of consumer protection. 
 
II. ONE-WAY CONTRACTS: THE TEMPLATE 
 
This section describes the legal concept of one-way contracts. The basic 
feature is simple: the terms of the transaction are enforceable only by one 
party, the business. They are not enforceable by the other party, the 
consumer. Thus, if the consumer breaches the terms of the contract, say, by 
failing to make timely payment, the business can resort to legal remedies. 
The business can sue the consumer, employ collection agencies, and engage in 
any self-help measure that is legally available. But if it is the business that 
breaches the terms of the contract, say, by failing to make timely delivery or 
by tendering non-conforming goods or services, the consumer cannot resort to 
legal remedies for breach of contract. Other legal claims, if available, may 
apply (tort, administrative, criminal), but not consumer-oriented contract 
remedies. 
 
A. Transforming Consumer Contracts into One-Way Contracts  
 
Consider the standard fine print contract between a business and a 
consumer, say Apple iTunes “Terms of Service.”10 The agreement contains 
numerous terms that are aimed to secure the rights and interests of the 
business, such as convenient choice of law or forum, disclaimer of warranties, 
ownership of intellectual property, severe limitations on consumer usage and 
distribution rights (hence the right to sue when consumers violated these 
limitations), termination and modification of service rights, and, of course, 
                                                        
9 FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, Id., at 59‐60. 
10 This is the “clickwrap” contract users accept when they sign up to have an iTunes account and 
download the software to play music or movies. It is modified from time to time. The updated version 
can be viewed at http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/service.html 
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the right to charge consumers for purchased item. The agreement also 
contains terms that confer rights to consumers. Primarily, the consumer 
acquires downloadable content fro a modest price, to be delivered in a 
convenient and immediate manner. The consumer also acquires rights 
drafted in the fine print, such as the number of authorized copies of music 
tracks consumers can make (“burn”), protection of privacy (promise not to sell 
information about the consumer to third party advertisers), or the right to 
receive non-defective service or to obtain a refund otherwise.  
Under the one-way contracts regime, this contract will be enforceable 
whenever iTunes has a complaint, e.g., when the consumer fails to make the 
proper payment, makes unauthorized copies, or distributes files without 
permission. In these situations, iTunes will be able to apply both its legal 
remedies to collect damages and self-help measures through digital controls. 
The contract will not be enforceable, however, if it is the consumer who has a 
complaint. If, for example, it turns out that the file was defective or not as 
described and iTunes refuses to issue a replacement or a refund, the 
consumer would have no legal recourse. Worse, if the business violates its 
data privacy commitments and collects unauthorized personal information in 
order to sell it to marketers, again the consumer would have no contract 
remedy and would not be able to sue and recover damages.11  
Here are a few more examples how standard consumer contracts would 
look under a one-way contract regime:  
Airlines will have the right to collect the full payment for the travel 
from passengers, but any promise to leave on time or to arrive in the 
destination on time will not be legally enforceable. If they promise that flight 
001 would land in a specific destination, they can breach the promise and 
land in a different destination. None of the consequential harm to the 
passengers would be legally recoverable within a contract breach action.  
Phone companies will have the right to collect timely payment for the 
services and any termination penalty that is valid under general rules of 
contract law, but their own obligations to provide adequate uninterrupted 
service or to refrain from violation privacy concerns will be unenforceable. 
Banks and lenders, including credit card issuers, will have the right to 
collect all the fees and interest rates that they secure in the agreement, but 
their customers will not have a legal right to enforce the symmetric promises 
to, say, pay interest on deposits.  
                                                        
11 Although the privacy violations may give rise to claims under statutory law, e.g., Children 
Online Privacy Protection Act, 16 C.F.R. 312.5(a)(1) (inernet privacy); and Privacy of Consumer 
Financial Information, 16 C.F.R 313.8. 
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Sellers of consumer goods (TVs, appliances, computers, etc.) will have 
the right to collect payment but buyers will not have a legal right to enforce 
the express and implied warranties, the return policy, low price guarantees, 
and the like. 
In all these examples, the businesses have the right to be paid under 
the contractually stipulated terms. If the payment was made in advance (as 
in the iTunes or the TV purchase examples), the business does not need an 
additional layer of legal protections to enforce its rights. But if the payments 
are deferred or made on a periodic basis (as in the phone service example) the 
business needs the legal right to enforce full payment when it is otherwise 
not made. From the consumers’ perspective, in all these examples they 
receive an “executory” promise—one that is to be performed later, after the 
contract is signed and some of the money is paid. Rarely would these 
consumers have self-help measures that would completely shield them from 
loss. Even when they can withhold some future payment, it is likely that 
some payment was already made and some reliance was already sunk. Thus, 
in all these examples, legal enforcement is the standard mechanism to 
safeguard the otherwise insecure promise consumers received for their 
money. One-way contracts eliminate this safeguard. 
 
B. Drawing the Line between Business’ and Consumers’ Rights 
 
But what happens if the business goes beyond its legal right and takes 
more than it is entitled to? What happens if, say, the business charges more 
than the authorized amounts from the consumer’s credit card—outright 
fraud!—and, based on the agreement, the consumer is seeking redress? Can 
the consumer recover the excess charge? The right to be paid no less than 
$0.99 per track is iTunes’ right and it is fully enforceable, but the right not be 
charged more than $0.99 per track is the right of the consumer. The 
consumer probably shopped around for the preferred deal and chose this 
particular transaction based largely on the price. Can the consumer enforce 
this right? Does the one-way contract bar recovery by the consumer even in a 
case of theft by the business? 
The absence of enforceable rights for consumers does not mean 
lawlessness. Even in a one-sided boilerplate, the limits of the business’ rights 
are clearly marked. The business is entitled to collect the posted price of the 
service ($0.99 per track), not more.  If the business acts fraudulently and 
collects $99 instead of $0.99, the consumer has a right to recover the funds in 
excess of its contractual obligation. Restitution of $98.01 is not a contractual 
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remedy—it is the same remedy that protects one’s property rights when they 
are illegally expropriated. Whether it is a stranger or a contractual partner 
that embezzled the consumer’s money, recovery is available. 
This idea, that some consumer rights are “property” rights and not 
merely contractual seems reasonable, but it creates a line drawing problem: 
which rights can consumers enforce by law (“the right not to be charged more 
than $0.99 per track”) and which rights are not enforceable by law (“receive 
the selected track without defects”). It is not clear that a coherent line can be 
drawn. What if the consumer acquired a track but the iTunes, by activating a 
digital control, caused it later to malfunction or be deleted. Does the 
consumer have a property right that can no longer be interfered with? 
Conceptually, one way contracts deprive consumers of any contractual 
remedy, but they leave in tact any other legal remedy that is not founded in 
the contract. First, some of the anti-consumer practices employed by the 
business are likely to violate state and federal consumer protection laws, 
anti-fraud legislation, and criminal laws. These statutes often provide 
separate cause of action to victims, and otherwise empower state attorneys to 
mount a concerted enforcement effort. If iTunes were to charge $99 per track 
instead of $0.99 it would potentially be liable under consumer protection 
laws.12 Second, businesses that embezzle their clients’ assets, make 
unauthorized charges to their clients’ accounts, or destroy the value acquired 
by the consumers are committing torts. Here, the consumers’ right to recover 
the money or the property taken illegally is not contractual. Rather, it is a 
restitutionary remedy, attached to their property in rem. The consumers are 
not claiming their property based on the contract. They are claiming their 
property based on the absence of any contractual obligation in which they 
agreed to part with this property. 
I am drawing a distinction here between contract claims on the one 
hand, which would be eliminated, and all other legal claims—tort, 
restitution, public law—which would remain in tact. This distinction is an 
approximation and does not rest on exact principles. Roughly, the idea is that 
non-contractual claims can potentially be large in magnitude and thus 
valuable and practical to the consumer. Even a $5 contract can give rise to 
large tort and property claims against a misbehaving business. Still, a 
cleaner conceptual principle can be developed by proposing the elimination of 
not only contract claims, but all individual claims that are difficult to 
vindicate. The next section explores these boundary issues. 
                                                        
12 See, e.g., Michigan Consumer Protection Act § 3(1), MCL 445.903(1) (1976). 
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C. What Is a Business-to-Consumer Contract? 
 
Not all contracts would be one-way. Business-to-Business (“B2B”) 
would, of course, be outside the one-way realm (for one, it’s not clear which 
way the one-way would go). They are mutually binding, if only because the 
right to recover under the contract is practically valuable. Consumer-to-
consumer (“C2C”) contracts are also not one-way. It might be that some C2C 
transactions are in effect no-way contracts, practically unenforceable either 
way. When one individual sells a second hand item to another individual on 
craigslist.com or at a yard sale, there is little need and little value for a 
legally enforceable contract. Little need—because there is a moment of 
barter, when the good is exchanged for money after being inspected. It might 
fail to work, but this consequence is often within the reasonable expectations 
of buyers in such circumstances, reflecting an implicit allocation of risk, so 
there is no breach. Little value—because an aggrieved buyer who later 
discovers that the item was deceptively described would not likely go to court 
for redress. It’s too costly to sue, and the seller is often hard to track down. 
In some circumstances, C2C contracts might be two-way contracts. 
Even though the aggrieved individual would still find it costly to sue, the 
other party—also an individual of little sophistication and means—might 
also find the cost to defend prohibitively costly and might settle. Further, 
some C2C transactions are of substantial value, as in the sale of residential 
property (although neither the individual buyer nor the individual seller of 
residential property are “consumers” in the normal sense of the term). When 
the value is substantial, suits are feasible and preserving the two-way 
contractual enforcement module is valuable. 
The Business-to-Consumer contract (“B2C”) is a transaction between a 
sophisticated party on one side and an individual acting as a consumer on the 
other. The sophisticated party’s interest in the legal consequences of the deal 
go beyond this particular transaction, since it enters a multitude of similar 
transactions with many other one-time consumers. The sophisticated party 
also has the resources to engage in legal enforcement measures. It often 
engages the service of enforcement professionals—lawyers, collection 
agencies, and the like. Having sunk a fixed cost in setting up an enforcement 
apparatus, the business has a credible threat to enforce anytime the 
consumer breaches the contract, even when the stakes are low. The 
individual on the other side does not have the same repeat game angle. It 
also does not have the sophistication to know for sure what its legal rights 
are, whether they were breached, and to what extent would the alleged 
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breach entitle him to legal remedies. And, above all, the individual consumer 
does not have the resources to pursue any kind of litigation enforcement 
strategy. It is unlikely that an attorney will take the case on a contingency 
fee basis, given the small stakes. And the time, money, and psychic costs 
involved in pursing a personal vendetta against the business is often 
prohibitive. 
But not all transactions between consumers and business are subject 
to the enforcement barrier. For one, individuals sometimes enter contracts 
with business entities not in their capacity as consumers. An individual 
hiring a construction company to build a custom-designed house is often 
dealing at arms length with the business: choosing among custom bids, 
negotiating idiosyncratic terms, dictating contract language, exerting 
bargaining power, and so forth. The stakes are high and a lawsuit is a viable 
strategy in cases of breach by the business.  
Thus, the B2C contract can be defined not according to the type of 
parties—“Business”, “Consumer”—but according to the asymmetric 
enforcement power. It could be defined as any contract in which on one side 
stands a sophisticated party capable of pursuing legal remedies and on the 
other side stands an unsophisticated party unable to engage in legal 
enforcement. This can map on to a different set of parties than the typical 
business/consumer parties. Big business can exert similar asymmetric 
enforcement environments on non-consumers, on other business partners 
such as small suppliers or intermediates that are so dependent on continued 
business that they will not dare sue their partner. Still, in the remainder of 
this essay I will consider only asymmetric enforcement environments in 
which a consumer interfaces with a business. It is in these environments, I 
will argue, that consumers have protection strategies that outperform the 
meek legal remedies regime.  
There are some transactions even between consumers and businesses 
that are hard to classify. Take as examples mortgage contracts, new car 
purchases, or the purchase of time share apartments. On the one hand, these 
are often standard form contracts in which consumers have the classic 
passive role in contract formation: no dickering over legal terms, non-
readership of the boilerplate, failure to understand some of the deferred 
consequences. On the other hand, consumers do have substantial bargaining 
power in negotiating the price. And, importantly, if the business breaches the 
contract consumers usually suffer a large enough loss to justify the pursuit of 
contract remedies. Should these transactions be classified as one-way 
contracts? 
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At this point I will leave the line distinguishing some B2C transactions 
from others undrawn. Whether or not high-value B2C transactions like auto 
purchases and mortgage contracts ought to be treated as one-way or two-way 
contracts cannot be resolved as a matter of definition. Later, after exploring 
the alternative safeguards that consumer have, it will be possible to give a 
functional answer. Even high stakes transactions can be one-way contracts if 
effective consumer protection is available outside contract law.  
 
D. Insurance Contracts 
 
In a one-way contract regime, any B2C contract is not enforceable by 
consumers. This includes sales contracts, financial contracts, service 
contracts like communications, travel, and home improvement, and much 
more. It should not include, however, one type of B2C contract—the 
insurance contract. True, insurance transactions are some of the most 
extreme cases of asymmetric enforcement power, in which giant insurance 
conglomerates face off against unsophisticated individuals. Still, there are 
several reasons to let these contracts remain legally enforceable.  
First, despite the asymmetric litigation power, individuals are often 
capable of pursuing litigation against insurance companies. The reason is 
that when the allegedly covered contingency materializes, the loss to the 
insured is substantial, worth the cost of suing, high enough to lure an 
attorney to take the case on a contingency fee basis. That is, even when the 
insurance company breaches the contract, there is only a small probability 
that the insured will experience this breach—the probability that the covered 
peril actually materializes. But the inverse of this probability is (roughly) the 
multiplier that defines the stakes to the insured, making it very large.  
Second, in insurance transactions the “product” is the legal terms. In 
return for the money it pays the insured does not get any product enjoy or 
any other kind of “performance.” It gets nothing other than a promise to 
make contingent payments if some conditions occur—an elaborate “warranty” 
term. If the insurance policy is legally unenforceable, the insured will be 
receiving nothing for its purchase. 
Third, even in mass insurance arrangements conducted under 
standard policies the right of the insured to receive contingent payment 
under the insurance policy is idiosyncratic. Since the right arises, and is 
defined by, some event or loss that occurred, the performance obligation of 
the insurance company to make coverage payments varies from case to case. 
It is wholly different than the obligation of, say, Comcast, to provide adequate 
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phone or high speed internet signal. Thus, despite the fact that insurance 
transactions are created with standard terms, they are often individualized 
and involve strong idiosyncratic elements (hence the importance of the 
neighborhood insurance agent as intermediary between the business and the 
consumer.) For one, this means that these are not the type of transactions in 
which individuals can compare the shopping experience of others to inform 
their own choices. It also means that individuals will not be able to rely on 
other market-oriented protections (to be discussed below) to provide a 
substitute for legal enforcement. 
Indeed, it is instructive to note that in some consumer protections acts, 
the term “consumer transaction” is defined to exclude contracts of insurance. 
Thus, despite the fact that these contracts are generally for purposes that are 
primarily personal or household related, insurance is excluded.13 
Finally, there is another reason why the one-way contract regime 
would not apply to insurance contracts. Even if the three reasons discussed 
above were not valid and insurance contracts were to be viewed as typical 
mass markets B2C contracts, a one way contract regime would need to make 
them enforceable. As I will argue below, one major way to substitute legal 
enforcement of contracts is to insure against the loss. I will argue that 
insurance can improve both the compensation and the deterrence roles that 
are intended to be advanced by contract law. The only way to make insurance 
available as a substitute for contract enforcement is to leave the insurance 
contract itself enforceable. This is not an artificial construct: insurance 
contracts can remain legally enforceable because they do not contain the 
same systematic failures that other B2C contracts have. 
 
E. Mutuality 
 
Is a one-way contracts regime reconcilable with legal doctrine? The 
main problem is the conflict with the doctrine of mutuality. Under this 
doctrine, which is an offshoot of the requirement of consideration in Anglo-
American contract law, parties cannot enter a contract in which one side is 
bound and the other side is not.14 Such a scheme fails to satisfy mutuality, 
the contract is not enforceable, and the bound party is free from her 
obligation. One-way contracts are an extreme example of non-mutuality: the 
                                                        
13 See, e.g., Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act § 2(a)(1); Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act § 
1345.01(A). 
14 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.2 (4th Ed. 2004) 
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consumer is bound, the business is not. Accordingly, contract law would 
refuse to count these contracts as legally enforceable. 
Technically, there might be ways to overcome the problem of non-
mutuality. Generally, all that is required is that the business have some 
obligation to the client—that it would not have unfettered discretion to walk 
away from it obligations. The obligation may be to provide notice of its 
decision to terminate its performance,15 or to be bound to perform during 
some minimal initial duration, or, generally, to provide some measure of 
value to the consumer. If the business is bound to do something, its promise 
is not “illusory” and mutuality would be satisfied. Put differently, the 
problem of mutuality can be circumvented by inserting artificial obligations 
on the business, for the sole purpose of demonstrating that the business does 
not have complete freedom to disregard its obligation. All that is needed is 
the minimal quantum of obligation that counts for the mutuality doctrine. 
That said, I am not sure how relevant is the problem of mutuality, or 
its technical solution, for the present study. It might be that the problem of 
mutuality is insurmountable, guaranteeing that the one-way contract regime 
would never be implemented; or it might be solved through some tinkering 
with the contract design. These are implementation problems. My inquiry 
here into the one-way contract module is not proposed as a blue print for 
reform. If it were, the non-mutuality “bug” would render the scheme 
worthless, or else the fixes would be crucial. Rather, this module is offered 
here as a challenge to mainstream consumer protection views, which aim to 
strengthen the legal remedies available to aggrieved consumers. The basic 
point is that consumer protection can be more successful if legal remedies are 
instead weakened. As I will now argue, one-way contracts may foster better 
ways to protect consumers against businesses. In this spirit, one-way 
contracts can be regarded as an ideal type, which may not be legally 
implementable but may nevertheless expose desirable directions for 
development and reform in the law. 
 
                                                        
15 Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 37‐38 (8th Cir. 1975) 
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III. REAL ONE-WAY CONTRACTS 
 
One-way contracts are described here as a hypothetical regime, a 
species altogether different from the existing model of two-way contracts. But 
in an important sense already discussed, they are more than hypothetical. 
When consumers’ rights to sue for legal remedies are impractical and 
ineffective, never invoked, one-way contracts describe an existing reality.  
Are there situations in which consumers recognize that there is no 
legal recovery available against the business—that there are no enforceable 
rights—and yet continue to patronize the business? The answer, I believe, is 
that there are many such situations. Think, for example, about supermarket 
purchases. There is, of course, a legal contract between the consumer and the 
supermarket. So much so that contracts students were now routinely asked 
to practice their command of offer-and-acceptance doctrines by identifying 
the legal status of supermarket ads, store window and shelf displays—all as 
an exercise of identifying the time of contract formation. No doubt, a strict 
contract formation moment can be backed out even in a generic supermarket 
visit.  But this is merely a “pedagogical” contract, which has almost no 
practical traction in the real world.  
Unlike many other consumer transactions, in the supermarket there is 
no boilerplate involved, no click ‘I Agree,’ no additional term-of-service record 
attached to deal, you can’t even find any contract on the store’s website.16 
There are almost no contract disputes on record that required court 
proceedings,17 no expectation damages, no express warranties, no risk-of-loss 
problems, in short none of the staple legal issues that accompany contracts 
for the sale of goods. Instead, there is a deal: Pay the price and the good is 
yours. Some stores provide accommodations, such as an opportunity to return 
the goods after a reasonable chance to inspect it, either for money restitution 
of for substitute goods. There might be, in the background, another set of 
contract issues between the consumers and the remote manufacturers. Suits 
against manufacturers are not uncommon. But it is unheard of that a 
supermarket would refer an aggrieved consumer to the remote manufacturer. 
Instead, supermarkets offer replacement or refunds, and then deal directly 
with the manufacturers. Are they operating as intermediates that assure the 
                                                        
16 See, e.g., www.wholefoodsmarket.com, which does not contain any link to the contract that 
governs the retail grocery transactions. Contrast that with the websites for other retailers, such 
www.bestbuy.com or www.dell.com, each of which contains links to the retail contract. 
17 I did a Lexis check of New York and Federal cases showing “supermarket” or “grocer” and 
“breach /1 contract” or “warranty” or “Restatement /3 Contracts” or “UCC”. 
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quality of the product in the relationship between the consumer and the 
business/manufacturer? 
Some stores post signs with return policy and low price guarantees, 
which would count as a contractual obligation. But this is more common in 
department stores or in businesses that deal with large ticket or durable 
items. It is quite uncommon in supermarkets. Supermarkets probably 
accommodate consumers who make reasonable requests to return goods that 
are visibly non-conforming, but not because they can otherwise be sued. 
To be sure, supermarkets can have substantial legal liability to 
consumers. Tort law is one source of liability, when consumers were exposed 
to unreasonable risks during the shopping experience. Anti-fraud regulations 
create additional liability, when the store engages in deceptive practices such 
as false advertizing or price labeling.18 Antitrust law can create liability when 
the store’s practice is anti competitive. Food law places requirements of 
conformity with sanitation and safety standards that, too, can lead to 
administrative action. And there are probably many additional licensing and 
administrative regulations that give rise to liability for violations. But one 
form of enforcement is missing in this generic, everyday transaction: action 
for breach of contract. What distinguishes these various forms of enforcement 
from contract suits is the magnitude of the remedy and the incentive to 
pursue it. In tort or antitrust the harm can be substantial. And in other 
areas, the absence of private incentive to sue is resolved by public 
enforcement. 
In the end, with all these legal controls, consumers may be more or less 
satisfied with their supermarket experience, but this depends on factors like 
service, cleanliness, selection, ease of product return, and the price/quality 
ratio.19 The quality of the “contract”—problems with warranties, breach, non-
performance, fine print, and the like—does not feature in the measures of 
satisfaction.20 
Supermarkets are not unique in operating in a de-facto one-way 
contract regime. Taxicabs are another example. It is telling that when a 
passenger hops into a New York or Chicago medallion cab, she immediately 
                                                        
18 FTC Regulations – Retail Food Stores Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. 424.1 
(defining deceptive and unfair marketing acts by food stores) 
19 See, e.g., Dirk Dusharme, 2007 Retailer Customer Satisfaction Survey, available online at 
www.qualitydigest.com/pdfs/2007retailsurvey.pdf.  
20 Measures of the customer satisfaction in the supermarket industry include factors such 
perceived quality, perceived value, customer complaints, and customer retention. See, e.g., 
www.theacsi.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=147&Itemid=155&i=Supermarkets
. 
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views the “Passenger Bill of Rights”—a list of substantial obligations that the 
taxi company and its operator have to comply with to make the service 
better.21 When posting the Bill of Rights, the cab company is probably 
conveying the following message: “we know you have no effective legal 
recourse against us, but we nevertheless promise to make our service comply 
with your reasonable expectations.” For a variety of reasons, the passenger 
would find it exceedingly impractical to recover from the cab company if any 
of the billed rights is breached – if say, the cabin is dirty, the driver plays 
loud music, or takes a long route to the destination. Indeed, in a search I 
conducted through the entire case law of New York, I found no breach of 
contract cases that were successfully brought by consumers against taxi 
companies.22 
What about restaurants—do consumers have a de facto contractual 
right against the restaurant, which can give rise to remedies for breach? 
What if the food is not as described, in terms of ingredients or preparation? 
There are, to be sure, situations in which patrons are injured as a result of 
inadequately prepared food and seek recovery. It is likely, though, that a 
combination of tort recovery for personal injury and administrative action by 
licensing bureaus can achieve all of the compensation and deterrence goals 
that a contract recovery would. A consumer right to sue on the “contract” 
here is either inexistent or redundant—two sides of the one-way contract 
coin. Here too, a search though case law revealed a reality in which no 
contracts suits are ever brought.23 
                                                        
21 See New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, Passenger Information: Taxi Cab Rider Bill 
of Rights, at www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/taxicab_rights.shtml 
22 I did a Lexis search for New York and federal cases with text including “taxi” or “cab” and 
“breach /1 contract” or “warranty” or “Restatement /3 Contracts” or “UCC”. I found seven cases that 
seemed relevant, but only one that included a pure contractual claim (as opposed to veil piercing or 
tort)—a claim of implied warranty. The claim against the cab company was rejected. See Ruse v Inta‐
Boro Two‐Way Radio Taxi Associates, Inc, 166 AD2d 641(NY App 1990). 
23 I did a Lexis search of New York and Federal cases with text including ((“restaurant” or 
“bistro” or "pizzeria") not w/5 "v.") and ((breach /1 contract) or warranty or (Restatement /3 
Contracts) or UCC) and not CORE‐TERMS(employ*) and not CORE‐TERMS(labor) and not CORE‐
TERMS(lease) and not CORE‐TERMS(insurance) and not CORE‐TERMS(tenant) and not CORE‐
TERMS(landlord). I found many cases in which a contract warranty claim against the food provider 
was brought along with a claim for recovery in tort, relating to injury from defective products. 
Beyond that, I only found a few suits.  In one, a plaintiff unsuccessfully made a breach of contract 
claim against a restaurant that had video surveillance in the restroom. Damages for emotional 
distress were awarded in tort. See Dana v. Oak Park Marina, 230 A.D. 2d 204, 212 (1997). In another, 
a plaintiff sued a restaurant owner on a contract claim for failing to break up a fight in which he was 
injured, but the suit was denied because statute of limitation applied to the same act with respect to 
liability in tort. See Smith v. Whit Tower Management, 129 N.Y.S 545, 549 (NY 1954). In another suit, 
a plaintiff injured by consuming toxic whiskey during the national Prohibition was denied in its tort 
claim because of the (then) narrow definition of sellers’ liability. A split court allowed the contractual 
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There is another, altogether different, reality that embodies the one-
way contract model—the presence of mandatory arbitration clauses. These 
clauses make it impossible for consumers to vindicate their right in court, 
sending them instead to arbitration proceedings. There is an ongoing debate 
whether mandatory arbitration blocks or facilitates suits. The different cost 
structure of arbitration, the different procedural rules, and the different 
patterns of recovery awards make it difficult to compare the expected 
recovery in arbitration versus litigation for a generic consumer complaint.24 
For a while, mandatory arbitration clauses had a distinct asymmetric 
element: they applied only to complaints by consumers, not to claims brought 
by the business. This element of “non-mutuality” has been the subject of close 
scrutiny by courts. Indeed, in several prominent decisions courts have held 
that the non-mutuality feature renders the mandatory arbitration clauses 
unconscionable.25 Other courts disagreed: nothing in consumer contracts is 
mutual, and neither should the arbitration mandate be.26 To be on the safe 
side, business now draft mutual, or symmetric, mandatory arbitration terms. 
Technically, arbitration clauses, even if non-mutual, do not render the 
contract one-way. Consumers can still seek legal remedies through 
arbitration. But these remedies are different. For one, it is quite more 
difficult to certify a class action in arbitration, or to join suits. For consumer 
contract claims to be pursued individually, they need to involve such high 
stakes that is almost never the case. Indeed, in scrutinizing these clauses 
courts often require minimum procedural accommodations, such that would 
guarantee effective access to arbitration and prevent these contracts from 
remaining one-way.27 
To the extent that arbitration effectively blocks class actions and 
access to increased remedies (such as exemplary damages and attorney fees), 
it has a significant effect of transforming many low-stake consumer contracts 
into one-way contracts. This effect is often viewed as denying consumers their 
rights to legal remedies. Thus, the mandatory arbitration clauses have been 
denounced as “the Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990’s,”28 a “monster,”29 and that as a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
claim for breach of warranty despite the illegality of the contract. See Bolivar v. Monnat, 232 A.D. 33 
(NY 1931).  
24 See, e.g., Symposium on How Bad Are Mandatory Arbitration Terms?, 41 Mich. J. L. Reform 777 
(2008). 
25 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.2000) 
26 Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488 (2004). 
27 Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 
52 Buffalo L. Rev. 185 (2004); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998). 
28 Katherine Van Wesel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow 
Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denver U. L. Rev. 1017 (1996) 
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result  of  them  “large  areas  of  U.S  life  and  commerce  have  silently  been  insulated 
from  the  lawsuit  culture.”30   Descriptively, then, they are perceived to have 
transformed consumer contracts into one-way contracts. 
 
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION SUBSTITUTES 
 
Stripping consumers of the right to pursue legal remedies in the event 
of breach weakens their contractual entitlement and reduces its value. It can 
be debated how significant this weakening would be, given that legal 
remedies are hard to get, but let’s assume for now that the insecurity 
generated by the formal elimination of the legal enforcement rights is 
substantial. That is, let’s assume that if all else remains equal, consumers 
would perceive this regime to make them significantly worse off. This 
insecurity would translate into reduced willingness to buy: lower prices to 
reflect the lesser value consumers get and, at the extreme, exit of consumers 
from markets. These are market effects, and it is therefore natural to ask 
what other market responses might emerge to mitigate these effects? How 
will markets adjust to provide consumers with the protections that they 
perceive to have lost under a one-way contracts regime? The following 
discussion sketches several plausible market responses 
 
A. Redesigned Transaction 
 
Consumers are likely to be concerned about putting much money on 
the line when all they get is a promise that not legally enforceable. One 
extreme response is to return to the mode of transaction that preceded 
contract law – a barter exchange. When the buyer gets the return value on 
the spot, he is less likely to be cheated. Of course, in modern transactions this 
is not much of a solution. For one, the value of the good sold cannot always be 
assessed at the time of the exchange and buyer would have to rely on 
affirmations and promises regarding quality and durability that are not 
enforceable. Moreover, many transactions involve ongoing consumer services 
which by their nature are provided over time and cannot be tendered upfront. 
But transactions might still be designed differently, to address 
consumers’ anxiety about their non-rights. Recognizing that they have no 
legal recourse, consumers might be reluctant to pay upfront and await, or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
29 David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights 
Claims in the Ages of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 33, 36 (1997). 
30 Patti Waldmeir, How America is Privatizing Justice by the Back Door, FINANCIAL TIMES 12 (June 
30, 2003). 
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pray for, timely conforming delivery. Instead, consumers might require (and 
businesses might accord them) a different sequence of payments and 
commitments to reduce the magnitude of the consumers’ losses in the event 
that they are cheated. One simple way to achieve this is to defer payment till 
some measure of consumer satisfaction is achieved. Consumers would be 
accorded a more substantial set of rights to inspect the value of the goods or 
services, to reject them if they are non-conforming, all before making any 
substantial payment. Instead of paying and then relying on promises and 
assurances—the legal warranty—which will no longer be binding, consumers 
will only have to pay upon some verifiable satisfaction. 
One way to redesign transactions to enhance consumers’ rights to 
inspect and reject is by carving up an otherwise integrated transaction into 
many small pieces, with the right for the consumers to exit in many specified 
location. For example, a long-term cell phone contract would be broken down 
to pay-as-you-go structure without any commitment, giving the consumer the 
right to pursue his reasonable expectations by switching to another provider. 
Or, to think of another example, an expensive product may be offered in 
“pieces”—leased rather than sold—thus reducing the consumer’s anxiety 
about malfunction. As I suggested in the Introduction, we can imagine that 
big-ticket items like computers and home appliances will be offered for rental 
or through a rent-to-own arrangement, with option to terminate after 
specified (short) intervals. The overall cost to consumers would not need to 
rise because in equilibrium consumers will choose not to terminate—thhe 
threat they have to terminate would assure that the value they get is 
satisfactory. 
The basic element of redesign is the increased domain for “self-help”—
measures that consumers can take when they perceive the promise made by 
the business to have been breached. The most effective self-help measure is to 
stop the payment. The business can sue for a payment that was inadequately 
withheld, and so the consumer would have to make sure that payment is 
stopped only when the promise was indeed breached. To make these 
determinations simple contracts could be designed to give consumers right to 
terminate prospectively at will and withhold payment only for future 
performance, not for past inadequate performance. For example, many 
telecommunications companies not offer service without a fixed-term 
commitment. Trying to lure consumers who are weary of contractual 
commitments that are replete with unpleasant surprises, companies like 
Comcast and AT&T provide telephone and cable service that can be cancelled 
any time without penalty. It is quite telling that the market term for these 
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types of agreements “No Contract Required.” Consumers receive the desired 
protection with less contract, rather than more. 
Not all transactions can yield to simple piece-by-piece break up or at 
will termination by consumers. Cars, for example, are already offered for 
lease, but the commitment required from the consumer is long, at least 
several years. A smaller commitment—car rental—is disproportionately 
expensive not only because of the transactions costs, but largely due to 
asymmetric information and incentive problems. But markets can 
experiment with small commitments that are not disproportionately costly. 
For example, many consumers rent cars from zipcars.com, shielded from any 
long term commitment, without incurring a disproportionate cost and with 
surprisingly low transaction cost.  
It is quite possible that any kind of market protections that might 
develop to substitute for legal enforcement would involve some transactions 
costs that would otherwise, under a perfect legal enforcement regime, be 
saved. But we can also expect that market experiments would develop with 
designs that reduce the added transactions costs. In the present context, 
contract designs that carve up long-term contract into pieces may introduce 
new switching and set up costs, but like the case of zipcars or prepaid cell 
phones these transactions costs can be cleverly minimized. 
 
B. Private Bonds and Assurances 
 
If a transaction is perceived to involve some risk of non-performance or 
forfeiture, consumers can turn to private bonds and assurances to secure 
their payment. In some limited way, retailers already provide this service. If 
you buy a product at Macy’s and find it lacking in any way, you can return it 
to the store with little hassle and receive a refund. The fact that the 
manufacturer made a defective product and refuses to repair it is of less 
consequence to the customer who can return to the retail outlet and receive 
adequate attention. High-end retailers bundle the sale transaction with some 
form of assurance and charge an appropriate premium, depending on the 
generosity of the plan. Discount outlets often unbundle the two. 
But what if the retailer itself is the irresponsive business? What 
guarantees can a consumer turn to? In the internet, intermediaries 
specializing in consumer protection services are already budding. 
SquareTrade, for example, warrants internet purchases of electronics in a 
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way that is relatively cheap and hassle free.31 It supplements the warranty 
term provided by the retailier or the manufactuer (probably the most 
important legal right that the consumer has) with its own repair and replace 
warranty. Its service is easy to price and to purchase and claims are 
relatively easy to administer. 
SquareTrade’s warranty kicks in only 60 days after the product was 
received. But what if the product was never shipped, or arrived defective? 
Another group of intermediaries that provide some protection immediately 
after the purchase is payment intermediaries. Credit card companies provide 
purchasers with purchase protection, usually restricted to a period of 90 days 
from the date of purchase. This coverage is broader than for contract breach 
by the seller; it covers losses from, say, theft or accident as well. But this 
coverage is also narrower in several ways. It does not apply to items lost in 
the course of delivery; and it is capped by the purchase amount charged to 
the credit card. 
Credit card issuers provide purchase protection to buyer in order to 
induce buyers to make purchases that they might otherwise not make, and to 
use the credit card as the form of payment. Other payment intermediaries do 
the same. For example, PayPal offers a Buyer Protection Plan that 
reimburses buyers for the full price and shipping costs in the event that they 
complaint against the seller is found to be meritorious.32 In similar fashion, 
companies that operate market platforms can provide customers who enter 
their market with protections. As mentioned in the introduction, eBay Motors 
provides disappointed buyers a fund from which they can recover the lost 
payment when the seller defrauded them, up to $50,000.33 This coverage is 
provided free for most of the vehicles purchased. It can be extended also to 
cover the car’s condition—the express warranty—but only if the seller opts in 
(and presumably pays eBay to supply this added coverage). As an 
intermediary between many buyers and sellers, eBay can monitor the 
conduct of sellers “on behalf” of the buyers. It can (and does) charge sellers for 
the cost of the buyer protection program, but it can differentiate the price 
according to seller’s record and it can expel sellers who breach their 
obligations, preventing future abuse.  
These examples demonstrate the emerging role of intermediaries in 
securing contractual rights that are currently also legally enforceable. It is 
                                                        
31 See www.squaretrade.com/pages/learn‐more‐warranty‐buyer 
32 See https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi‐bin/webscr?cmd=xpt/UserAgreement/ua/USUA‐
outside#pbp‐policy 
33 See www.pages.ebay.com/help/buy/ebaymotors‐protection.html#vehicles 
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plausible that in a one-way contracts regime, where promises would no longer 
be legally enforceable, the function of such intermediaries would be 
expanded. eBay, for example, could offer a buyer protection program for all 
purchases, not just automobiles. Credit card issuers could offer broader 
guarantees, covering not only an extended warranty term or outright fraud, 
but also various other types of non-performance.  
In these situations, the intermediaries provide not only an insurance 
function, but also a monitoring and deterrence function. These systems work 
because the intermediaries care to protect the integrity of the market in 
which they are operating, to attract as many buyers. eBay would surely kick 
out a seller whose pattern of performance gives rise to higher incidence of 
claims. Strong intermediaries like eBay or Visa harness their market power 
to warrant consumers’ satisfaction. The intermediaries effectively operate as 
sophisticated enforcement agents for dispersed, unsophisticated buyers. 
To be sure, the expansion of the guarantees provided by intermediaries 
is limited by the intermediaries’ own verification problems. Visa cannot, for 
example, confirm whether the hotel room was clean enough, and eBay cannot 
confirm whether the iPod was refurbished with a sub-par sound. Their 
advantage, though, is that monitoring can be done though aggregation. As 
long as the intermediaries can perform some limited monitoring of individual 
claims and weed out the most frivolous ones, they can credibly compare the 
performance of businesses. A business that receives a higher ratio of 
complaints is underperforming relative to market averages, suggesting that 
buyers’ expectations are collectively not met. This business will find it more 
difficult to compete once the coverage premium attached to its sales 
increases. 
Of course, the intermediaries themselves are businesses whose 
obligations to the buyers are contractual. The problem then becomes circular: 
without enforceable legal rights against businesses, consumers do not acquire 
any legal right against the intermediaries. What guarantees do buyers have 
that the intermediaries will indeed make good of the bonds and assurance 
they provide? In the end, I will have to argue that the contractual promises 
made by intermediaries are safe for reasons other the one discussed here. 
That is, the bond promises are safe not because of some other bonds that 
secure them or some other intermediary services. If they are safe, it must be 
due to other market related mechanisms, such as reputation and ratings. In 
this sense, the bond mechanism has only a limited role. It alone cannot 
provide the ultimate security for contractual promises. But the presence of 
assurance intermediaries does facilitate the work of other informal 
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enforcement mechanisms. The bond intermediaries specialize in aggregating 
information about the performance of the business and manage the claims of 
the consumers in an efficient way, providing a more solid informational basis 
for the application of other enforcement mechanisms. 
 
C. Insurance 
 
Like any measurable risk, breach of contract is a risk that might create 
opportunities for insurance. If the removal of legal remedies imposes greater 
risk on consumers, there would be increased demand for coverage against 
this type of hazard—an insurance arrangement against bad performance by 
the business. And if the patterns of this risk can be measured and predicted 
in a systematic way, insurance companies would supply this coverage. 
The insurance arrangement is conceptually different than the bonds 
and protection intermediaries. For one, it can apply to more hazards than 
merely warranty-related defects or fraud. It can potentially apply to 
consequential losses and to personal injuries and thus go beyond the more 
limited refund/repair/replace remedy offered by various assurance 
intermediaries. It could also provide recovery in contingencies that 
technically do not constitute breach, but are nevertheless costly to the 
consumer. For example, when an airline or a cruise departs late the traveler 
might experience significant losses, which are not compensable under the 
contract but could potentially be compensable under an insurance scheme. 
Moreover, insurance coverage can apply even when the consumer had some 
contributory fault—dropped the iPod or arrived late for the flight—situations 
which are usually excluded under intermediary protection plans. 
Insurance can be sold on a transaction-specific basis, whereby it can be 
tailored to the specific actuarial risk. This, however, would impose a 
significant transaction costs and would make it look more like SquareTrade. 
To the extent that the insurance coverage goes beyond an extended warranty 
service, it is more complex to underwrite, making it difficult to supply on a 
per-transaction basis. More likely, the insurance coverage would be sold per-
consumer—applying to the entire defined class of B2C transactions that the 
insured would enter during the term of the policy, say one year. It can attach, 
for example, to the consumer’s home owners’ insurance policy, as yet another 
covered risk—the “contract breach peril.”34  
                                                        
34 Many homeowners policies cover personal property including property not located at the 
residence, and losses arising from unauthorized use of credit cards. See, e.g., Insurance Services 
Office HO‐3 Policy, Section I Coverage C and D. 
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It is possible that insurance markets would have to innovate and 
develop new practices to make coverage for the contract breach peril work. It 
might require, for example, simplified procedures for filing claims and 
investigating their validity. It could also be that consumers would choose to 
have arrangements with their insurers to cover only certain types of B2C 
transactions (e.g., all transactions over $1000), where the costs of 
administering claims would not overrun the utility of the insurance. 
In this environment, insurers will have a role that goes beyond passive 
coverage. One obvious role is to manage the claims of the consumers and 
separate the valid from the frivolous. In many areas, this verification role is 
precisely the craft that insurers perform best. Medical insurance plans, for 
example, are often nothing more than claim administrators (the risks are 
borne by employers). Insurance investigators have the best access to evidence 
regarding the merits of any individual claim ex post, better than courts and 
surely better than the consumer service department of the business who sold 
the complained-over product. And since the insurer has a significant sanction 
against frivolous claims—increased future premia, forfeiture of other 
coverage—it can deter such claims better than other potential claim 
administrators. There is of course room for abuse—for frivolous claim denials 
by insurers—but this is a standard problem that insurance law is well 
equipped to deal with, particularly through punitive damages. 
Another obvious role of contract breach insurers is to efficiently 
underwrite the risk. Insurers have more information about the likelihood of a 
potential claim—the insured’s “propensity” to file claims—because they can 
keep records of the rate of past claims by the insured, or infer this from other 
correlated behaviors. Whereas the SquareTrade warranty can, at most, 
aggregate information about a particular seller or product, an insurer can 
cross the same information with each insured’s record. Moreover, insurers 
have an infrastructure for aggregating data across the industry, something 
that other assurance intermediaries don’t have. 
Insurance can also have a deterrent effect against misbehavior by 
business, but the deterrent mechanism here is a bit more subtle than either 
in other insurance contexts or in the intermediary bonds case. In other 
insurance contexts, the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s right against 
the liable party. The medical plan or the first party auto insurance can 
recover their coverage expenditures from the injurer. Contract breach 
insurers would not be able to sue bad-behaving businesses that imposed 
“occurrences,” because the aggrieved consumers would not have any legal 
right to subrogate. Moreover, in the context of intermediaries and bonds, 
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deterrence operates through the price mechanism. SquareTrade charges 
higher price to warrant a bad product, making the overall package of 
product+warranty more expensive and thus less purchased, thereby 
providing incentive for businesses to reduce the incidence of claims. 
Insurance, however, cannot price coverage according to the business-specific 
risk, because it is not sold per transaction.  
Still, insurers can deter bad behavior by business through other 
practices. For example, they can threaten to blacklist any business which 
exhibits a record of high incidence of claims, refusing to insure its 
transactions in the future, and thus alerting consumers and rendering the 
non-performance risk more salient. Insurers can write exclusions such as 
“this policy does not cover purchases from Gateway.” Because insurers can 
aggregate and share actuarial data on the non-performance risk that 
businesses pose, these blacklists can be reliable. Or, if blacklists are 
distasteful, a different practice can be to offer a menu of premia: the 
insurance premium can be $400 if it applies to all purchases, and only $100 if 
several exclusions apply. Insurers, for example, can provide a list of 
businesses with whom the contracts are fully insured, and apply a significant 
deductible or cap to contract breaches with any business not on the list. 
It is not my intention here to go through all possible contours of the 
contract breach insurance arrangement. The point is more general. Insurance 
is not only a mechanism for spreading risk. Importantly, it is often an 
efficient institution for handling and verifying claims, administering them, 
pricing them, and creating accurate deterrence. Currently, insurance 
companies have no role in administering consumer claims for contract 
breach. Rather than relying on the legal system to clumsily micro-manage 
such claims, private insurance markets can provide an alternative platform. 
 
D. Ratings 
 
When  deciding whether  to  enter  a  transaction with  a  business,  individuals 
would care more about their legal “exposure”—how likely they are to be affected by 
the absence of remedies for breach. They would have a greater need to predict the 
degree of overall satisfaction that they will obtain, in light of the price charged, and 
relative to other transactions offered by other businesses. Knowing that there are no 
legal  remedies,  consumers would have a greater motivation  to know how  likely  is 
breach to occur, or when it does, the extent to which the business will redress their 
dissatisfaction.  They  would  therefore  turn  to  find  out  how  satisfactory  was  the 
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experience  of  previous  consumers  who  dealt  with  this  business  in  this  type  of 
transaction.  
Ratings  of  the  quality  features  of  the  transaction  is  a  deep‐rooted  market 
practice  that  allows  consumers  to  conduct  price/satisfactions  predictions.  For 
example,  when  reserving  a  hotel  online,  Expedia.Com  and  other  reservations 
services  rate  each  hotel  on  the  basis  of  average  customer  reviews  along  several 
attributes (cleanliness, service, comfort). When deciding how to vote for a senator, 
voters can check how the candidate is rated by the Environmental Defense Fund or 
the NRA. When choosing a restaurant, Zagat and other review networks provide a 
score  and  a  simple  breakdown  of  features  that  reflect  the  quality  of  the 
establishment  relative  to  its  cohort.  When  buying  a  new  car,  Consumer  Reports 
provides  a  variety  of  ratings  of  performance,  safety,  durability,  as well  as  overall 
recommendations.  When  purchasing  goods  from  an  online  retailer,  various 
intermediaries provide ratings  that help shoppers predict  the quality of  the goods 
sold  and  the  reliability.  Cnet.Com,  for  example,  refers  buyers  who  search  for 
electronic appliances to various retailers and models, rating each over a variety of 
parameters that affect consumers’ satisfaction, aggregating the experience of prior 
buyers.  Likewise,  eBay uses  a well‐known  feedback  rating  of  each  seller,  showing 
the number of prior sales, the percentage of satisfied customers, and its score over 
several dimensions of satisfaction. In fact, it is hard to think of market transactions 
that are not subject to consumer or expert ratings: movies, restaurants, music, new 
books, used books sellers, blenders, pizzas, coffee, … 
In a one-way contracts regime, consumers will have to rely even more 
on the performance reputation of businesses and less on their promises. 
Thus, the ability of a business to attract new customers and to charge higher 
prices would depend all the more on the reliability of feedback scores, ratings, 
consumer surveys, reports by watchdog groups—that is, on the aggregate 
measures of the scattered experiences of past customers.  
These  rating  scores  aggregate  some,  but  not  all  aspects  of  the  transaction 
with the business. Averages might not capture the subtleties. Still,  individuals who 
are not interested in spending the time to study the details can rely on the ratings to 
chaperone them through the comparison shopping process. Their advantage is that 
they  put weight  on  those  aspects  that  average  consumers  and  users  actually  care 
about most,  the  factors  that  predict  the  ex‐post  degree  of  satisfaction.  Moreover, 
techniques that provide relevant and reliable aggregations are likely flourish. 
It is imaginable that a more fine breakdown of aspects can be offered, including for 
example  a  rating  of  the  “contract”  or  of  the  “legal”  experience—the  quality  of  the 
boilerplate terms once they are brought to bear on the transaction. It is not clear, of 
course,  that  consumers  care  to  know  about  the  legal  terms.  Usually  they  care  to 
know about how good the transaction will be when it  is performed, not how bad it 
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will be when breached. But  they do  like to know the  likelihood of breach and how 
the legal terms handle it. How good is the warranty and repair service? How difficult 
it is to return the goods for replacement, repair, or refund? How effectively did the 
vendor  respond  to  problems  with  the  service?  Were  there  hidden  fees  and 
surprising burdens originating from the fine print? Were there restrictions—legal or 
digital—on the types of permitted uses? Was the contract modified post‐purchase in 
an  unfavorable way?  To  the  extent  that  consumers want  to  know  these  issues  in 
advance,  independent  of  any  other  overall  measures  of  satisfaction,  ratings  can 
provide such of information.35 
Ratings and similar reputation scores have become all the more important in 
electronic commerce, and the inner works of rating schemes have been perfected by 
successful web services like eBay, Amazon, and Expedia. But this does not mean that 
ratings  are  uniquely  useful  on  the  internet.  The  reason  why  internet  commerce 
relies  so heavily on ratings and reputation  is precisely  that  standard remedies  for 
breach  are  significantly  weaker  in  internet  transactions.  Businesses  are  remote, 
unfamiliar,  small,  under‐capitalized,  sometimes deal  in used or  refurbished goods, 
and  offer  significant  discounts—all  are  factors  that  normally  increase  consumers’ 
apprehension  and  require  extra  assurances.  Remedies  for  breach  of  contracts  in 
these settings are extremely weak. There is nothing much the law can do to help a 
consumer defrauded by a fly‐by‐night business. Contracts here are perceived to be 
one‐way not by legal design but by practical constraints. It is quite telling, therefore, 
how the pragmatic decline of traditional legal remedies went hand‐in‐hand with the 
phenomenal rise of ratings and reputation scores. 
The internet  facilitates the dissemination of ratings, but this does not mean 
that  the  mechanism  works  only  for  ecommerce.  Zagat  and  Cnet.com  are  good 
examples to the contrary. The internet can be a locus where consumers can search 
for ratings and scores for every type of transaction, even if  that transaction would 
eventually  take  place  in  the  brick‐and‐mortar  world. With  the  advent  of  internet 
user‐based wiki‐style  information aggregators,  reputation has become an effective 
source of discipline against opportunism everywhere, beyond its traditional role in 
close‐knit communities.  
Indeed,  the  power  of  each  consumer  to  post  a  negative  feedback  provides 
powerful  deterrence.  In  ebay,  for  example,  __.  Moreover,  consumers  can  provide 
detailed  accounts  of  their  experience,  highlighting  horror  stories  in  a  way  that 
received attention from future users. While this provides little or no redress (once 
the negative feedback is posted, it is often difficult to undo and thus businesses have 
no incentive to remedy the particular complaint), it provides significant deterrence. 
                                                        
35 For discussion of some issues related to ratings of contracts, see Omri Ben‐Shahar, The Myth of 
Opportunity to Read in Contract Law, 5 European Review of Contract Law 1 (2009). 
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For  one,  the  effect  on  future  business  from  consumers  who  are  exposed  to  the 
negative  rating  could  be  more  painful  than  a  legal  remedy  for  breach.  More 
importantly, these ratings are very easy to post and thus the threat to inflict then on 
a  misbehaving  business  is  far  more  credible  than  the  threat  of  an  aggrieved 
consumer to file suit. 
 
E. Voluntary Accommodations 
 
The mechanisms discussed thus far suggest that businesses’ 
obligations, while legally unenforceable, could nevertheless be largely 
complied with even in a regime of one-way contracts. But it is possible that 
legal non-enforceability will nurture compliance beyond the letter of the 
promise. Businesses may be ready to accord their customers more 
accommodations, to go beyond the contractual language, to forgive 
immaterial burdens and fees, in short, to provide consumers with value that 
exceeds what was literally promised.36 Such conduct would be intended to 
infuse consumer confidence especially among the otherwise reluctant 
consumers who, themselves without enforceable contractual rights, are 
rationally anxious. Thus, ironically, the absence of enforceable contractual 
rights could boost the bottom line average satisfaction that consumers get, all 
else equal. 
Their obligations being unenforceable, businesses don’t have to grant 
any value to consumers, and certainly don’t have to grant any voluntary 
accommodation. But they can do so selectively. Consumers who are regarded 
by the business as honest or as source for continued profit, or who are 
regarded as likely to leave a positive feedback that would affect the business’ 
rating if treated well and negative feedback otherwise, would be treated to 
more accommodations than consumers who are suspected of cheating or 
chiseling, or whose further business is no longer sought. Thus, in a one-way 
contract regime, given that businesses can easily “stick it” to some consumer, 
a greater wedge can be created between the values received by desired versus 
undesired consumers.  
Of course, this ability to selectively abuse some consumers is 
troublesome, and hopefully the mechanisms discussed above diminish such 
                                                        
36 For an analysis of how and why businesses already go beyond the contract language and 
accord consumers accommodations, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One­Sided Contracts 
in Competitive Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3‐11 (O. Ben‐
Shahar, Ed., 2006); Jason S. Johnston, Cooperative Negotiations in the Shadow of Boilerplate, in 
BOILERPLATE: FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 12‐28 (O. Ben‐Shahar, Ed., 2006). 
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potential. But the upside—the ability to accommodate “good” consumers—can 
be an important source value.  
 
V. WHY ARE ONE-WAY CONTRACTS NECESSARY 
 
The substitute protection devices described above may very well arise 
in the absence of contract enforcement, but would they not also arise in the 
presence of contract enforcement? Aren’t these devices—fragmented 
transactions, insurance services and purchase protection plans, ratings, 
consumer protection acts—already available, alongside contract enforcement? 
Is it necessary to transform contracts into a one-way module to attain the 
benefit of the various alternative protection devices? If one-way contracts 
benefit both business and consumers, why do parties not opt into such a 
regime voluntarily, writing contracts with minimal legal protections for 
consumers? 
To be sure, some of the alternative protection devices are emerging 
side-by-side with the (de jure) availability of contract remedies. And yet we 
don’t see, for example, an insurance product for the contract breach peril. 
Consumers are not willing to pay for an assurance that is perceived to merely 
replicate the assurance they receive from the business (say, double up a new 
product warranty). That is, despite the fact that contract promises made by 
businesses are almost impossible to legally enforce, many individuals 
maintain a potentially false sense of security in the knowledge that they are 
contractually protected, and are unwilling to buy additional insurance (other 
than warranty extension programs). Most consumers have not tried to sue 
businesses or to pursue legal remedies for breach and thus have not 
experienced the futility of this strategy. For them, having an enforceable 
contract creates a perception of security that makes other protections seem 
less necessary. 
While this false perception of security can be irrational, it may also 
have a rational foundation, which explains why it persists and why the 
alternative protection devices are slow to emerge. Even in the absence of a 
credible threat to sue, breach of contract is an infrequent event. The great 
majority of consumer transactions are adequately performed by business. The 
great majority of products and services consumers purchase live up to the 
expectation. Even if consumers interpret episodes of non-performance as 
indication of the weakness of contract, these may be offset by the inverse 
interpretation of more numerous episodes of adequate, or above-expectation 
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performance. In short, it is difficult to generate an accurate assessment of low 
probability events. 
There are additional, more subtle reasons why the alternative 
protections are slower to develop in a two-way contract world. One reason is 
asymmetric information. The business would often be in position to direct 
consumers to alternative protections such as insurance, warranty services, 
and ratings. But when consumers’ prior is that the business is also providing 
an enforceable contractual promise, the business has no incentive to endorse 
any complementary assurances. If the business were to do so, this could be 
taken as a signal by consumers that there are greater-than-otherwise-
perceived grounds for insecurity. Why else would the business promote or 
refer to other protections? That is, all else equal, the protections are more 
necessary the weaker the contractual commitment, or the greater the 
propensity to breach. Since the business has private information about this 
propensity, the endorsement of such protections would lead to a negative 
inference by consumers about this information. In this setting, efficient 
protective devices will not be promoted by the business. It is still possible 
that they will be developed by third parties, but without the bundling of these 
assurance services with the purchase itself, such devices would impose added 
transactions costs and will be slower to develop. 
Indeed, on eBay, where the value of legal remedies for breach of 
contract is known to be low, vendors openly refer buyers to their rating 
scores, to assurance program like SquareTrade, to non-legal dispute 
resolution services, and other protections. Here, there is no asymmetric 
information: consumers know that the value of legal remedies for breach is 
negligible. Businesses who acknowledge this fact by highlighting the 
presence of other protections do not suffer a penalty in the form of reduced 
willingness to pay. In contrast, when selling insurance policies, car leases, or 
cellphone calling plans, the vendors emphasize the policy and the legal terms, 
and do not refer the customers to consumer satisfaction ratings or other 
assurances. 
This is an unraveling problem. Another way to think about it is the 
following. Suppose the market developed a new insurance instrument—the 
contract breach hazard policy, and would price it in accordance with the 
actuarial risk that different businesses pose. The business would then have 
an incentive to induce the consumer not to purchase this insurance, by 
providing it in-house, bundled with the primary consumer transaction (in the 
same way that stores offer extended warranty programs). Even if the 
business knows that there is a substantial likelihood of breach, it would offer 
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the consumer discounted or “free” insurance, in attempt to signal quality and 
boost product price. The business would have an incentive to underprice this 
component, because it increases the willingness of the consumer to enter and 
to pay for the primary transaction. Thus, in a world of two-way contracts, the 
threat by the business to appropriate the insurance component of the service 
undermines the emergence of such independent insurance products. This 
problem would not arise in a one-way contract regime because consumers—
having no legal remedies to fall back on—would not be willing to rely solely 
on the business’ unenforceable contractual promise. 
One-way contracts could strengthen the alternative consumer 
protections for another reason, by refocusing social controls and reforms. 
Currently, much of the consumer advocacy effort is directed at improving the 
legal terms associated with contract, the opportunity of consumers to read 
the fine print in contracts, the access of consumers to courts, and the legal 
remedies available against a breaching business. For example, the two main 
proposals made in the ALI’s Principles of Software Contracts, which 
represent the latest effort to protect the rights of consumer-users against 
software vendors, are (1) to provide users with a “robust” opportunity to read 
the terms upfront,37 and (2) to strengthen or make mandatory some 
warranties.38 Or, to take another prominent example, it is often argued—and 
held by courts—that mandatory arbitration terms ought not be enforced 
because they deprive consumers the power to file private suits, vindicate 
their contractual rights and breach remedies in court.39 Similar agenda is 
pursued by the European Community, focusing on sharpening the legal 
remedies available to consumers in private law.40 
If one thinks that these reforms would help many consumers, then the 
one-way contracts regime ought to be rejected. One-way contracts do not 
strengthen private suits but eliminate them. My own view is that these legal-
power-to-the-consumer reforms would do far too little to help. Improving the 
consumers’ opportunity to read would help very few potential readers 
(estimated at far less than 1% of the population of consumers).41 Providing 
                                                        
37 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts § 2.01 and comment c 
(Discussion Draft, March 30, 2007). 
38 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts § 3.02 (Discussion Draft, 
March 30, 2007). 
39 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare, 6 P.3d 669, 689‐90 (Cal. 2000). 
40 Counsel Directive 99/44, OJ 1999 L171/12 (remedies); Directive 2001/95 (transparency). See, 
generally, Stephen Weatherill, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY (2005). 
41 Florencia Marotta Wurgler, Are ‘Pay Now, Terms Later’ Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence 
from Software License Agreements, 38 J. Legal Stud. (2009); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta‐Wurgler, 
and David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to 
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mandatory quality and striking arbitration terms would help very few 
potential litigants, the sophisticated ones who can secure legal representation 
in adjudication.  
If, instead, one thinks that these reforms are not particularly helpful, 
then it is good news that such futile efforts to bolster the efficacy of 
contractual rights through private law enforcement would become irrelevant 
under a one-way contracts regime. Instead, efforts should be redirected 
towards improving the availability of effective ratings, reducing transactions 
costs for redesigned deals which give consumers more choice and more ways 
out, creating easy-to-use insurance products, improving platforms for 
reputation to develop, and the like. Rather than provide an opportunity to 
read for consumers who would never utilize this opportunity, or provide a 
theoretical opportunity to sue for consumers who are exceedingly unlikely to 
pursue this strategy (or gain any meaningful compensation through it), 
consumer protection would follow a different path. Thus, the value of one-way 
contracts regime would be to shift reform effort to areas where it would 
actually help. 
This is not to argue that one-way contract solution is the only viable 
consumer protection regime. There may be other models of government 
control, which, if correctly calibrated, could help. Indeed, various recent 
reforms are concerned with government regulation of consumer transactions 
and products like credit cards and mortgages. Under these reforms, public 
agencies would reassume a central role in determining which products can be 
offered and which not, and monitor against violations. It is beyond the scope 
of this article to examine the merits of this approach and I have nothing to 
say prima facie against this more ambitious form of intervention. These 
reforms harness the enforcement power of the government to protect 
consumers, and in a fundamental way share the premise underlying the one-
way contracts regime, that consumers cannot defend themselves alone. It 
takes more than private lawsuits by aggrieved consumers to discipline an 
opportunistic business. It might require some government intervention, but 
the scope of this paper is on the availability of market substitutes to private 
suits. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Standard Form Contracts (Mimeo. 2009). See, generally, Ben‐Shahar, supra note 1.Error! Bookmark 
not defined. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
It is well recognized that consumers’ well being depends on factors 
other than the protection afforded to them by private law. I am surely not the 
first to argue that other safeguards are important. My purpose here was to go 
beyond some of the age-old truths, e.g., that competition among businesses or 
that education of consumers and disclosure of information can help bolster 
the integrity of consumer transactions and improve consumer satisfaction. I 
highlighted some additional devices, independent of competition and 
disclosure, which can substitute for legal protection of consumers. 
The claim in the paper, though, is more ambitious than merely 
identifying several substitutes for contract enforcement. After all, the fact 
that substitutes exist is not a reason to eliminate of one of the devices, 
however ineffective it might be. Instead, I argue that consumers can benefit 
from the elimination of the contract enforcement device. It is in the interest 
of consumers, I argued, to transact within a legal regime that strips them of 
the power to seek contract remedies for breach, while at the same time 
reserving the business side’s power to enforce contracts. The removal of one 
protection device would strengthen the other devices and would render 
consumer protection more robust overall.  
There is a sense in which the one-way contracts idea is merely a 
thought experiment. For one, I conceded up front that as a pure doctrinal 
move it is likely to be a non-starter, conflicting with very basic notions of 
contract law. One-way contracts are not contracts: in law, either both parties 
are bound, or none are bound—this is a fundamental corollary of the 
consideration doctrine. Further, the arguments developed here are 
exploratory in nature. I have not measured, neither analytically nor 
empirically, how much protection would be lost and how much would be 
gained by the removal of contract enforcement. I have also not proved, in any 
rigorous manner, that the alternative protection devices would indeed 
develop faster in the absence of contract enforcement. Some anecdotes might 
suggest that much, but they are subject to various possible interpretations, 
not all consistent with the logic of one-way contracts. Indeed, I left some of 
the boundaries as to what are B2C contracts vague, precisely because the 
value of the contract enforcement device can vary. 
There is a payoff to such thought experiment even if it does not lend 
itself to immediate law reform, because it sheds light on which factors matter 
when we talk about consumer protection. As I remarked in the Introduction, 
the paper is meant to be friendly to the interests of consumers. But it’s a 
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different version of friendliness. Rather than paying lip service to consumers’ 
“vindication of rights,” “access to justice” or proposing make-believe solutions 
like mandatory disclosure, the paper takes the reality of non-enforcement as 
given and considers ways to overcome it. It is the cultivation of more potent 
substitutes that can help consumers. 
So, in the end, it might be that the law will not relinquish consumers’ 
right to legally enforce their contracts. The message, though, remains. The 
way to help consumers is not to secure their rights to go to courts and get 
“meaningful” legal remedies. The one-way contract idea suggests that this is 
a misguided priority. Consumer protection ought to be accomplished by 
focusing on alternative protection devices. 
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